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ABSTRACT 
John W. Onderdonk 
The Effects of Box Office and Home Entertainment Revenue 
Performance on Equity Valuations in the Film Industry 
(Under the direction of Riccardo Colacito, Ph.D.) 
 
The film industry relies on a variety of different revenue streams that contribute to the 
overall financial success or failure of film companies. These companies derive the 
majority of their revenue from box office and home entertainment sales. The purpose of 
this research is to evaluate the effects of box office and home entertainment revenue 
performance on the equity valuations of companies in this industry. Using estimation 
techniques commonly found in finance literature, this study concludes that box office 
performance significantly impacts the equity valuations of film companies over both 
short-term and long-term periods. This study also reveals the effects of news on investor 
sentiment, demonstrates the cyclicality of company performance in the film industry, and 
proposes profitable trading strategies to capitalize on box office performance data. Using 
estimation techniques under similar circumstances, this study did not find a significant 
relationship between home entertainment revenue performance and equity valuations.  
 iii 
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LITERATURE REVIEW 
Introduction 
Characterized by perpetual creative destruction, the business world constantly 
replaces old technology with new technology to create competitive advantage and adapt 
to changing consumer preferences. Established industries and companies within those 
industries must match or exceed the innovations of new ventures in order to stay 
competitive and maintain market position. The film industry faces similar pressures from 
new innovations and competitive threats. Industry disruption due to the widespread 
adoption of streaming from companies like Netflix and Hulu has reduced demand for 
traditional home entertainment products, such as DVDs and Blu-Ray Discs. This 
declining demand for product offerings has prompted film companies to adjust their 
product mixes to reduce costs and increase consumer willingness to pay, resulting in 
rising profit margins for these companies.1 Given the niche nature of the home 
entertainment industry, academic researchers have not explored the joint effect of 
declining home entertainment demand and rising profit margins on actual profitability or 
investor expectations regarding profitability. Therefore, the joint effect of declining sales 
and rising profit margins is currently ambiguous to industry outsiders. 
Due to the sparse nature of previously conducted research on the film industry, 
this literature review will largely draw from the popular press and publicly available data 
                                                     
 
1 This insight draws from personal knowledge I gained from my role as a Commercial Finance Intern in 
Global Home Entertainment for Comcast NBCUniversal.  
 
 
2 
repositories to explain the state of the industry. The estimation techniques that I will use 
to demonstrate the relationships between box office revenue, home entertainment sales, 
and stock price performance are commonly used in finance academic literature, and I will 
chronicle the progression of scholarly research in the field. Through my research, I aim to 
use these common finance estimation techniques to yield novel insights in a relatively 
unexplored industry.  
This review of popular press and academic literature provides an assessment of 
relevant information regarding the film industry and finance estimation techniques. In the 
following sections, this review will analyze (1) the box office and home entertainment 
segments of the broader film industry, (2) innovations and disruptions in the home 
entertainment industry, (3) the use of finance estimation techniques to price assets 
according to observable characteristics, (4) the role of exogenous factors in asset pricing, 
and will include (5) a conclusion to draw connections between the disparate elements of 
this literature review. 
 
Box Office and Home Entertainment as Segments of the Film Industry 
 The film industry is divided into multiple segments that generate revenue for film 
companies. Business functions within the film industry include box office, 
merchandising, home entertainment, and television licensing. Due to consolidation in the 
entertainment industries, large media conglomerates (e.g., Disney, Comcast 
NBCUniversal, and Fox) typically own and control each functional segment for the films 
they produce and opt to license intellectual property for use in consumer products. This 
section will explain (a) the breakdown and importance of the distinct segments of the 
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domestic film industry, (b) the historical role of home entertainment specifically in the 
broader industry, and (c) shortcomings of traditional performance measures. 
Additionally, this section will rely somewhat heavily on popular press and online data 
repositories due to limited academic research on this industry. 
 
Domestic film industry 
 The domestic film industry is comprised of a few companies with a broad array of 
revenue streams that outsiders typically estimate according to a single metric. 
Consolidation within the industry has led to the formation of conglomerates with many 
different business units. In the film industry, six major companies made up a combined 
77% of box office revenue from 1995 through 2018: Walt Disney Studios, Warner Bros., 
Sony/Columbia Pictures, 20th Century Fox (recently acquired by Disney), Universal 
Pictures, and Paramount Pictures (Richter, 2018). Though films generate many ancillary 
revenue streams, the public typically judges the success or failure of a film solely by its 
opening weekend box office performance (Young, Gong, Stede, Sandino, & Du, 2008, p. 
9). This three-day period for a film determines its value from a contractual standpoint 
with regard to licensing deals for television, merchandising, streaming, etc. (Young et. 
al., 2008, p. 9). Additionally, because of its public availability, industry insiders use this 
box office metric as a predictive tool to estimate internal and external performance of 
ancillary revenue streams and make business decisions accordingly.2 As Powers (2015) 
notes, film finance reporting is often opaque. The cost of financing a project and its 
                                                     
 
2 This insight draws from personal knowledge I gained from my role as a Commercial Finance Intern in 
Global Home Entertainment for Comcast NBCUniversal. 
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revenue assumptions are often unreported, and “investments are not even necessarily 
priced by outsiders” (p. 1). Though judging success according to a single metric 
seemingly diminishes the importance of a film’s ancillary revenue streams, these 
additional sources of revenue make a huge impact on the industry’s bottom line. In 2017, 
for instance, domestic box office revenue totaled $10.51B across the industry while home 
entertainment sales grossed $20.49B (McCourt, 2018). Despite the apparent materiality 
of a film’s diverse array of revenue streams, financial performance in the film industry 
continues to face judgment according to a single metric. 
 
Home entertainment segment 
 The home entertainment segment, though often viewed as secondary to the box 
office segment, has a long history of product innovation that demonstrates the importance 
of its financial performance to the overall film industry. Home entertainment’s storied 
history began in 1977 when Magnetic Video first utilized JVC’s 1976 VHS technology to 
release feature-length films that could be viewed at home for $50-75 per copy (Epstein, 
2015). The next significant technological advancement took place in 1997 when home 
entertainment companies introduced DVD players and discs to provide better picture and 
sound quality along with endless reusability (Epstein, 2015). Home entertainment 
companies further enhanced this superior picture and sound quality with the release of 
Blu-Ray discs in 2006, and Apple eliminated the need for physical media altogether with 
its Apple TV streaming service in 2007 (Epstein, 2015). Lionsgate became the first 
movie studio to release the latest and most superior home entertainment technology—4K 
Ultra HD—in March 2016 (Arnold, 2016). The home entertainment segment’s product 
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offerings today include both digital media (e.g., subscription video-on-demand, digital 
purchases, digital rentals) and physical media (e.g., DVD, Blu-Ray, 4K, physical rentals). 
Subscription streaming comprises the largest share of the market, followed by physical 
media purchases (McCourt, 2018). The film industry has invested significantly in 
innovating new home entertainment technologies to provide a better viewing experience 
for consumers, which demonstrates the financial importance of the home entertainment 
segment to the broader film industry.  
 
Shortcomings of traditional performance measures 
 As detailed in a previous subsection, film industry analysts place disproportionate 
emphasis on box office revenue to evaluate film financial performance despite the 
materiality of other industry segments, such as home entertainment. If actual performance 
of the film industry’s ancillary revenue streams deviates significantly from the 
performance expected from a given film at a given box office level, then the research of 
Young et. al. (2008) would suggest analysts might not detect the deviation. According to 
the market size statistics from McCourt (2018), this limitation in publicly available 
knowledge could cause dramatic misestimation in aggregate financial performance for a 
film. Researchers have not yet explored whether or not actual performance from the 
ancillary revenue streams of a film directly affects sentiment regarding the financial 
performance of the film company.  
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Innovations and Disruptions in Home Entertainment 
 The home entertainment segment of the film industry has changed dramatically 
since its advent in 1977 due to technological innovations and disruptions to the industry. 
Two significant disruptions affected the way in which customers view media in the home. 
In 1985, Blockbuster opened its first store in Dallas, TX, allowing customers to rent 
physical media for brief periods of time to watch and return (Epstein, 2015). In 2007, 
Netflix started streaming movies online, which allowed consumers to watch movies 
instantly with no physical media required (Rodriguez, 2017). Both of these disruptions 
strongly affected home entertainment companies and forced them to adapt their business 
models to survive in the new environment.  
 
Blockbuster’s rental disruption 
 In 1985, Blockbuster started siphoning revenues from film companies through its 
rental system that disincentivized the purchase of home entertainment products. 
Customers who only wanted to watch a movie once after its theatrical release could do so 
at a much lower cost than purchasing the movie outright. Instead of fighting this trend, 
film companies saw the disruptive force of Blockbuster as an opportunity to generate 
revenue from price-sensitive customers who would be willing to pay for a rental but not 
for a purchase. They entered into strategic revenue-sharing alliances in which they sold 
movies in bulk to Blockbuster at a discount and collected a percentage of rental revenues, 
which ultimately generated higher sales for both Blockbuster and the film companies 
(Carr, Muthsamy, & Owens, 2012, p. 69). Through these partnerships, home 
entertainment companies adjusted their business models to profit from a threatening 
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industry disruption. Though Blockbuster eventually declared bankruptcy due to the 
significant decline in physical rental (McCourt, 2018), Family Video, one of 
Blockbuster’s competitors, has maintained a thriving rental business with over 700 stores 
by creating a fun, family-friendly shopping experience and servicing areas of the country 
without high-speed internet (Fink, 2018).  
 
Netflix’s streaming disruption 
 With the advent of Netflix’s streaming service in 2007, home entertainment faces 
a threat to physical media altogether. Like the traditional film industry, subscription 
streaming is a highly concentrated industry dominated by a few large competitors. Netflix 
leads the industry with 74% U.S. household penetration in 2018, followed by Hulu and 
Amazon with 36% and 28% penetration, respectively (Engleson, 2018). In 2017, $9.55B 
of domestic home entertainment revenue came from subscription streaming, increasing 
31% from 2016 (McCourt, 2018). DVD and Blu-Ray sales, on the other hand, accounted 
for only $4.72B, decreasing 14% from 2016 (McCourt, 2018). Home entertainment 
companies obtain payments to license content to streaming services, but this source of 
revenue has swiftly undercut physical media consumption (Hilderbrand, 2010, p. 27-28).  
 As with the competitive challenge Blockbuster presented in 1985, film companies 
are trying to adapt their business models to survive in a world dominated by subscription 
streaming and with physical media usage in sharp decline. Though physical unit sales are 
declining, film companies are trying to increase profitability by reducing costs and 
expanding profit margins. They have been able to expand profit margins to some extent 
through increasing purchases of digital units by 6% from 2016 to 2017 (McCourt, 2018), 
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which has lowered the cost-per-unit due to the lack of production and distribution costs 
associated with digital media. They have also promoted higher-priced, higher-margin 
physical media formats, such as Blu-Ray and 4K Ultra HD, by demonstrating the 
enhanced sound and picture quality of those formats relative to subscription streaming.3 
Film companies, thus, take a multi-pronged approach to maintaining profitability despite 
the rapid adoption of subscription streaming. However, no published research exists 
regarding how revenue fluctuations in the home entertainment industry affect investor 
sentiments regarding profitability. As discussed previously, the lack of publicly available 
sales information leads to the overemphasis of box office performance to indicate 
financial performance for films.  
 
The Use of Finance Estimation Techniques to Price Assets  
 This section of the Literature Review will detail the development of prominent 
asset pricing techniques that estimate returns according to observable characteristics. 
Investors and finance professionals have attempted to price companies according to 
observable characteristics for decades by finding significant relationships between 
company characteristics and stock price movement. In contrast with the previous two 
sections of this literature review, the academic literature on asset pricing models and 
finance estimation techniques is extensive. This section will explore (a) the development 
of prominent asset pricing models, (b) an example of the process for identifying an 
additional significant factor, and (c) the purpose of finance estimation techniques. 
                                                     
 
3 This insight draws from personal knowledge I gained from my role as a Commercial Finance Intern in 
Global Home Entertainment for Comcast NBCUniversal. 
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Development of prominent asset pricing models 
 Asset pricing models seek to estimate returns to a given financial instrument 
based on one or more factors. Jensen, Black, & Scholes (1972) put forth the first 
generally accepted asset pricing model—called the Capital Asset Pricing Model 
(CAPM)—that attempts to value securities as a function of their “systematic,” or 
“market,” risk. The model only accounts for systematic risk in determining the price of a 
security because they assumed that idiosyncratic risk can be removed through a well-
diversified portfolio. The fundamental finding of the model is that the beta of a stock—
which is the covariance of the returns of that stock with the return of the market divided 
by the variance of the market—determines the risk premium of the stock. As beta 
increases, the expected return of the stock increases. Subsequent researchers found that a 
single-factor model that only considers market risk does not capture risk factors that 
would be evident in a multi-factor model.  
Fama & French (1992) critiqued the research of Jensen, Black, & Scholes, 
arguing that the simple relationship between an asset’s beta and its average return 
disappears with more recent data from 1963 to 1990. They do not support the finding that 
average stock returns are positively related to market beta. Instead, they argue that, in the 
period from 1963 to 1990, a firm’s size and book-to-market equity “capture the cross-
sectional variation in average stock returns associated with size, E/P, book-to-market 
equity, and leverage” (p. 450). These two factors can be used as a proxy for risk in 
sorting companies and determining the equity risk premium. In their seminal work, Fama 
& French (1993) generated 25 factor portfolios, which sorted firms by size and book-to-
market ratio. They then ran time-series regressions of monthly excess returns on (1) 
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market excess return, (2) return on small-cap stocks minus return on large-cap stocks, and 
(3) return on value stocks minus return on growth stocks. The resulting three-factor 
model explains excess returns on a cross-section of stocks that would be viewed as 
abnormal by the research of Jensen, Black, & Scholes. Fama & French (1993) essentially 
expanded on the work of Jensen, Black, & Scholes by adding two additional factors to 
make the asset pricing model more robust. 
 
Example of the process for identifying an additional statistically significant factor 
 After Fama & French (1993) created a multifactor asset pricing model, 
subsequent researchers sought to improve the model further by adding additional factors. 
Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) examined the role that “momentum” plays in generating 
excess returns for stocks, finding that previous “winners” in the market exhibit a 
statistical tendency to become future “winners.” Grinblatt, Titman, & Wermers (1995) 
affirm this research by demonstrating that mutual funds following momentum strategies 
exhibit excess returns over time. Carhart (1997) constructed a “4-factor model using 
Fama and French's (1993) 3-factor model plus an additional factor capturing Jegadeesh 
and Titman's one-year momentum anomaly” (p. 61) to create a more robust four-factor 
model. In light of new research, Fama & French (1996) examined their original three-
factor model and concluded that their model failed to account for excess returns due to 
momentum. Researchers during this time typically viewed momentum as a relevant factor 
driving returns exclusively at the individual security level. Moskowitz & Grinblatt 
(1999), on the other hand, argued that momentum strategies for individual stocks become 
significantly less profitable when controlling for the industries in which individual stocks 
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reside. In other words, industry momentum almost entirely explains the momentum effect 
at the individual security level. The identification of momentum and further debate 
regarding its role in explaining asset return anomalies illustrate that new observable 
characteristics can be combined with previously accepted factors in an attempt to 
estimate asset returns.  
 
Purpose of estimation techniques 
The substantial amount of research in finance literature regarding momentum and 
other factors in asset pricing models demonstrates that stock returns can be estimated 
according to observable characteristics. Estimation techniques like those of Fama & 
French (1992) can demonstrate whether or not a significant relationship exists between a 
given observable characteristic and fluctuations in stock price. As evidenced by the 
evolution of asset pricing models through the decades, prominent researchers constantly 
use estimation techniques to look for new observable characteristics that affect stock 
prices, and they often disagree about the most predictive asset pricing models. 
 
The Role of Exogenous Factors in Asset Pricing 
 Researchers have explored the effects of observable characteristics on asset prices 
to a great extent. Most of these observable characteristics are financial metrics specific to 
given companies, such as size, valuation, recent performance, etc. However, 
macroeconomic trends and exogenous factors influence the share prices of companies to 
a great extent as well. This section will explore the roles of (a) demand shocks, (b) news 
events, and (c) innovations in affecting asset prices. 
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The role of demand shocks in affecting asset prices 
 Demand shocks are sudden events that increase or decrease a consumer’s desire 
for a particular good or service in the market. One example of a negative demand shock 
is the reduction in demand for physical media as a result of Netflix’s entry into digital 
streaming in 2007. Lucas (1978) presented an asset pricing model that placed the equity 
premiums of assets on the supply side of the economy while assuming consumption 
demand to have no volatility. Bansal & Yaron (2004) rebutted this model, arguing that 
consumption demand is also stochastic (subject to shocks), and it arguably plays a more 
integral role in determining the equity premium of an asset. Continuing the line of 
thinking of Bansal & Yaron (2004), Albuquerque, Eichenbaum, Luo, & Rebelo (2016) 
argue that the fact that conventional asset pricing models place all uncertainty onto the 
supply side of the economy while neglecting demand uncertainty creates a weak 
correlation between stock returns and observable fundamentals. They ascribe the majority 
of the equity premium to demand shocks. Recent research indicates that exogenous 
demand shocks affect the risk premium associated with a stock and, therefore, its price. 
 
The role of news events in affecting asset prices 
Significant news events or coverage also affect asset prices. Engle & Ng (1993) 
explore the relationship of news—good or bad—to asset price volatility. Though none of 
their models perfectly capture the asymmetrical effect of new information on stock price 
volatility, their study found conclusively that negative news coverage affects volatility 
with greater magnitude than positive news coverage. Furthering this research on the 
relationship between news and stock prices, Da, Engelberg, & Gao (2011) found that an 
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increase in Google search volume predicts higher stock prices in the next two weeks as 
the market absorbs new information followed by an eventual stock price reversal within a 
year. Their study of search volume also indicated strong first-day performance and long-
term underperformance of a sample of IPO stocks. These studies show that news 
powerfully affects stock prices for extended periods of time after the initial coverage as 
the market incorporates new information. 
 
Innovations affecting asset prices 
Economists have recently found that levels of innovation can be measured and 
demonstrated to affect asset prices. Kogan, Papanikolaou, Seru, & Stoffman (2017) 
explored the role that technological innovation plays in spurring economic growth. In 
their research methodology, they use newly collected data on patents issued to U.S. firms 
from 1926 to 2010 as a proxy for technological innovation, and, expanding on the work 
of Engle & Ng (1993), they compare stock price responses to patent news as a means to 
show the effect of patents on economic growth. Kogan et. al. found that innovation “is 
associated with substantial growth, reallocation, and creative destruction” (p. 706). They 
discovered a significant relationship between patents (as a proxy for innovation) and 
stock prices as a proxy for firm growth. As a result, they conclude that technological 
innovation accounts for significant medium-run fluctuations in aggregate economic 
growth. This research and the research in the prior subsections demonstrate that 
exogenous factors affect asset prices. 
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Conclusion 
The domestic home entertainment industry is a large, multi-billion-dollar segment 
of the broader domestic film industry. Due to the use of traditional industry performance 
metrics, such as box office revenue, and the lack of publicly available data on home 
entertainment sales, analysts estimate the performance of home entertainment and other 
ancillary revenue streams for a given film largely based on opening weekend box office 
revenue. The inability of this metric to provide accurate estimates could severely misstate 
the aggregate financial performance of a film because of the sizable percentage of 
revenue coming from outside the box office.  
Due to industry disruption through streaming, the market for home entertainment 
has experienced a negative demand shock. The popular press has documented these 
industry changes extensively, and home entertainment companies have introduced new 
innovations to increase retail prices, cut costs, and maintain increasing profitability. 
According to the academic research documented in this literature review, the stock prices 
of home entertainment companies should theoretically fluctuate as a result of these 
changes to the industry. However, the use of box office performance as a proxy for 
aggregate film performance potentially obscures the actual fluctuations in demand and 
profitability resulting from these industry changes. 
Finance estimation techniques, as detailed in this literature review, can indicate 
whether a significant relationship exists between box office revenue or home 
entertainment sales and the stock price performance of film companies. In the context of 
finance literature, box office revenue and home entertainment sales represent “observable 
characteristics” that can be analyzed relative to the stock prices of film companies to 
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determine whether or not a relationship exists. A lack of a significant relationship 
between home entertainment sales and stock returns could potentially indicate the 
ineffectiveness of using box office performance as the sole performance metric for a film 
because home entertainment sales do directly affect profitability and should, therefore, 
affect stock prices. The relationships between box office revenue, home entertainment 
sales, and the stock price performance of film companies have not been investigated 
previously in academia to my knowledge and will be the subject of this paper’s research. 
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DATASET OVERVIEW 
Introduction 
In this section, I detail the specifics of datasets that I use to demonstrate the 
effects of box office performance and home entertainment performance on the equity 
valuations of film companies. To determine the effects of box office and home 
entertainment performance on film company stock prices, I use (a) historical stock price 
data, (b) historical box office revenue data, and (c) historical home entertainment revenue 
data. I detail the sources and specifics of these datasets in the following section. 
 
Historical Stock Price Data 
 In this study, I use historical stock price data from May 2001 through November 
2018. My dataset contains daily opening prices and daily closing prices adjusted for 
dividend payments spanning that duration. Most stock price data used in this study comes 
from S&P Capital IQ, which I used as the default source for my price data. However, 
some companies from 2001 through 2018 have undergone mergers that resulted in the de-
listing of the companies from exchanges. Though S&P Capital IQ can pull historical data 
from companies that currently exist, it cannot retrieve data from companies, such as Time 
Warner, that have recently been acquired and are no longer listed on an exchange. In such 
instances, I used Investing.com because they publish records of historical data on 
companies that are no longer listed on exchanges.  
 
 
17 
Historical Box Office Performance Data 
  I use Box Office Mojo as the source of my box office data. Box Office Mojo is 
often used by industry insiders due to the reliability of its data reporting.4 For Section 1, 
which examines the stock returns of box office “hits” versus box office “flops” as defined 
by opening weekend performance, I use their datasets “Biggest Opening Weekends” 
(+$50M) and “Worst Openings” (3,000+ theaters), which yield data on 235 films and 200 
films, respectively. These openings were adjusted to 2019 dollars prior to being ranked.  
 In Section 2, which examines box office revenues on a monthly basis by 
company, I use Box Office Mojo once again based on their monthly year-to-date (YTD) 
box office revenue numbers by company. I manually converted these monthly YTD 
revenue numbers to monthly revenue numbers (e.g., by subtracting January YTD from 
February YTD, etc.) before performing analysis.  
 
Historical Home Entertainment Performance Data 
 My home entertainment dataset comes courtesy of a data analysis group that 
graciously provided me with their dataset free of charge for exclusive use in this research 
paper. For the protection of their data, they wish to remain anonymous. The dataset 
includes home entertainment revenue by week for seven major film companies dating 
back to January 2011. For the purpose of this study and of an equitable comparison with 
box office performance, I aggregated the home entertainment data from weekly sales into 
monthly sales. 
                                                     
 
4 This insight draws from personal knowledge I gained from my role as a Commercial Finance Intern in 
Global Home Entertainment for Comcast NBCUniversal. 
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RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to outline the methods that I will employ to answer 
the following research question: How do box office and home entertainment revenue 
performance affect the equity valuations of film companies? Because the following 
methodology references industry- and finance-specific terminology that may not be 
familiar to all readers, grasping the following list of terms and their definitions is crucial 
to understanding both the research methodology and the outcome of the study: 
• Box Office: A channel through which media is consumed during its theatrical 
release. 
• Durbin-Watson Statistic: A test for autocorrelation in the residuals of a regression. 
• Home Entertainment: A channel through which media is consumed 
following its theatrical release. Home entertainment for the purpose of this 
study involves all associated revenue streams (i.e., purchase, rental, 
streaming).  
• Factor Portfolio: A portfolio of stocks formed by sorting companies 
according to a given observable characteristic (or factor).  
• Rebalancing: The re-sorting of factor portfolios according to the given 
observable characteristic at a specified time interval.  
• Proprietary Data: Data that is not accessible to the public free of charge.  
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• Public Data: Data that is easily accessible and available free of charge to 
the public. 
• Serial Correlation (Autocorrelation): Correlation between a given variable 
and a lagged version of itself. The standard errors must be adjusted to 
compensate for the existence of serial correlation in regression.   
• Sharpe Ratio: The return of an asset above the risk-free rate over a 
specified period divided by the standard deviation in returns over that 
same period. 
𝑆ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑝𝑒 𝑅𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜 =  
𝑅𝑖 − 𝑅𝑓
𝜎𝑖
 
• Significance: A finding that the effect of a given variable is unlikely to 
have been zero with 90%, 95%, or 99% confidence. 
 
To answer this study’s research question most effectively, I will (1) examine the 
changes in stock prices of companies that released films with the best and worst opening 
weekend performances of all time in the days immediately following release and (2) 
construct factor portfolios to examine the effects that overperformance and 
underperformance in both box office and home entertainment revenue have on the equity 
valuations of film companies under different circumstances and periods of time.  
 
Research Method 1: Opening Weekend Box Office Performance  
In Research Section 1 of this paper, I will examine the effect that box 
office over- and underperformance has on stock prices in the initial days of 
release. Under this methodology, I will use publicly available data from Box 
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Office Mojo on the films that had the best and worst domestic openings in history. 
This methodology will reveal the extent to which opening weekend box office 
performance impacts investor expectations for company profitability. The 
following subsections will detail (a) the reasoning behind this methodology 
selection, (b) an overview of the methodology, and (c) objectives for the 
methodology.  
 
Reasoning behind methodology selection 
 This approach will reveal how investors react in response to “news 
events” pertaining to box office performance. According to Box Office Mojo, 
when a film is released, box office estimates for the weekend are provided by the 
film studios as early as Sunday morning on the weekend of release. The 
difference in stock price between the Friday Close and the Monday Open of a 
company that just released a smash success “hit” film, or a catastrophically poor-
performing “flop” film, could likely be attributed to changes in market 
expectations regarding the performance of that film. By showing how the stock 
prices of these companies move in the first two weeks of release, I can 
demonstrate how investor expectations regarding the profitability of these film 
companies change in a predictable manner in the cycle of each film release.  
 
Overview of the methodology 
In this methodology, I will use two sets of quantitative data as outlined in 
the Dataset Overview section: opening weekend box office data and historical 
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stock price data. For both the box office “hits” data and the box office “flops” 
data, I will calculate the stock price return of each company in the first 13 days of 
release for each given film. “Day 2” will denote the return from Friday Close to 
Monday Open on the first weekend of release, and “Day 8” will denote the return 
from Friday Close to Monday Open on the second weekend of release. All other 
days will denote the returns of the stocks from open to close on standard 
weekdays. The average annual return for each day of release will be calculated as 
a simple sum of the total returns for each category divided by the number of years 
in the sample. Additionally, I will construct a “Hit”-Minus-“Flop” (HMF) 
portfolio that holds the stocks of the “hit” releases and shorts the stocks of the 
“flop” releases. Based on the results of these portfolios, I will highlight potential 
trading strategies that could be implemented to yield profitable outcomes for 
investors. These trading strategies will be evaluated based on their historical 
Sharpe Ratios, and I will use the average 3-Month Treasury Constant Maturity 
Rate from the St. Louis FRED over the sample period as the “risk-free rate of 
return.” 
One limitation of this methodology is that, based on my criteria for 
defining “hits” and “flops,” each calendar year has relatively few titles being 
released in those categories. Until 2012, the annual returns for the “flop” portfolio 
were particularly erratic due to the relatively few “flop” films being released per 
year. In order to eliminate some of this volatility and provide an apt comparison 
between the “hit” and “flop” portfolios, I limited my analysis for both categories 
to include titles released from January 2012 through December 2018. By limiting 
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the dataset in this regard, my analysis in total includes 115 “hit” films and 125 
“flop” films.  
Finally, I will calculate the standard errors for the returns on each day of 
release to determine significance at confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
This exercise will differentiate the significant portfolio returns from those not 
distinguishable from zero.  
 
Objectives of the methodology 
 Through this methodology, I will seek to determine how the news of 
extreme overperformance or underperformance at the box office affects the stock 
prices of film companies in the immediate days following release. This 
methodology will demonstrate the degree to which investors pay attention to box 
office reports and whether the market incorporates this news into equity 
valuations of film companies. Additionally, by constructing the HMF portfolio, I 
will be able to better distinguish the returns that are specifically due to box office 
performance from returns due to irrelevant factors affecting the stock prices in the 
industry. Finally, I hope to use this methodology to propose profitable trading 
strategies that investors could employ based on box office data in the days 
following the release of a new “hit” or “flop” film.  
 
Research Method 2: Box Office and Home Entertainment Factor Portfolios 
 In Research Sections 2, 3, and 4 of this paper, I will construct factor portfolios 
sorted by box office and home entertainment revenue performance over varying time 
 
 
23 
periods. With this methodology, I will be using three quantitative datasets. In Sections 2 
and 4, which deal exclusively with box office performance, I will use publicly available 
box office performance data by studio and by month from Box Office Mojo, and I will 
use historical stock price data. In Section 3, which deals exclusively with home 
entertainment performance, I will use a proprietary home entertainment dataset from an 
anonymous data provider as well as historical stock price data. The following subsections 
will detail (a) the reasoning behind this methodology selection, (b) an overview of the 
methodology, and (c) objectives for the methodology. 
 
Reasoning behind methodology selection 
 I will construct these factor portfolios in a similar fashion to those 
constructed by Fama & French (1993). With regard to box office revenue 
performance, constructing factor portfolios using total box office revenue will 
allow me to determine how over- and underperformance for the entire slate of a 
given studio affects investor expectations for profitability over varied periods of 
time. This approach will lead to a more comprehensive analysis of holistic 
company performance than the examination of select films on opening weekend 
as in Research Section 1. Constructing factor portfolios in a similar fashion with 
home entertainment revenue will allow me to compare the effects of box office 
revenue on investor sentiment to the effects of home entertainment revenue on 
investor sentiment. Additionally, long-short factor portfolios have the inherently 
desirable characteristic of controlling for irrelevant factors (e.g., market return, 
industry return, inflation, etc.), and they reduce the impact of idiosyncratic 
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volatility. In short, generating factor portfolios that are sorted according to an 
observable characteristic will yield insights regarding the effect of that 
characteristic on the equity valuations of the underlying companies over time.   
 
Overview of the methodology 
 The approaches for the methodologies concerning box office revenues and 
home entertainment revenues will be similar in many ways with only a few 
differences. In both cases, I will develop factor portfolios sorted by year-over-
year (YoY) percentage change in revenue for the respective sorting period. The 
justification for sorting according to YoY percentage change as opposed to 
percentage change from the previous period is that the film industry features 
strong seasonal cyclicality in revenues, meaning that YoY percentage change 
would be a more appropriate performance comparison metric. I will examine 
sorting period lengths of one, three, six, and 12 months in both the box office and 
home entertainment revenue factor portfolios. The “top” portfolio in each instance 
will include the top two or top three companies as judged by YoY percentage 
change in revenue, and the “bottom” portfolio in each instance will include the 
bottom two or three companies as judged by YoY percentage change in revenue. 
In tables using only two companies in each portfolio, I will include a “mid” 
portfolio containing the returns from all of the companies in between the two 
extremes. These portfolios will be rebalanced on a monthly basis according to the 
sorting criteria. 
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 In addition to the varied lengths in sorting periods, I will also vary the 
lengths and starting points of the portfolio holding periods, which will determine 
the periods for return calculations. In all cases, I will examine the holding period 
returns both contemporaneously with the sorting period and conditionally 
according to the sorting from the prior period. Additionally, I will examine 
holding period lengths that directly match the sorting period lengths (i.e., one, 
three, six, and 12 months), and I will examine holding period lengths of one 
month regardless of the sorting period length. I will undertake these factor 
portfolio constructions identically for both box office and home entertainment 
revenues, though I will withhold certain results due to universally insignificant 
findings for particular criteria.  
 Key differences in the methodologies of the box office revenue and home 
entertainment revenue sections emerge from differences in the datasets. The Box 
Office Mojo dataset contains data from May 2001 through November 2018, and, 
due to changing industry dynamics, features between seven and 12 publicly traded 
companies in each period. The proprietary home entertainment dataset, on the 
other hand, contains data from January 2011 through November 2018 with a 
constant level of seven publicly traded companies per period. One key difference 
in the construction of the factor portfolios is that the “mid” portfolio will contain a 
varied number of companies in each period for box office performance compared 
to a constant number of four companies for home entertainment. An additional 
key difference is that the differing sample durations will yield many more 
observations for the box office performance factor portfolios, which will result in 
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lower standard errors of returns relative to those of the home entertainment factor 
portfolios, ceteris paribus. 
 One concern regarding the factor portfolio methodology—in which 
holding periods sometimes span multiple months, but returns are reported on a 
monthly basis—is the introduction of serial correlation. In instances where the 
Durbin-Watson statistics for the returns of factor portfolios indicate the presence 
of serial correlation, I will provide heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors 
using Stata’s “newey” command and a lag value of ⌈√# 𝑜𝑏𝑠𝑒𝑟𝑣𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑠
3
⌉. These 
adjusted standard errors will be used to determine significance of returns at 
confidence levels of 90%, 95%, and 99%. 
 
Objectives of the methodology 
 The primary objective of this methodology that I will employ in Research 
Sections 2, 3, and 4 is to determine the effect of total box office and home 
entertainment revenue performance on equity valuations of film companies over 
varied periods. By constructing factor portfolios, I will be able to distinguish the 
excess returns due to box office and home entertainment performance from 
returns due to extraneous factors affecting the stock prices in the industry. 
Additionally, this approach will be more comprehensive in including films other 
than the extreme “hits” and “flops” for each company than the approach taken in 
Research Section 1. Furthermore, by examining the sorting periods and returns 
over longer periods, we can observe any cyclicality emerging from the film 
industry based on the effect of over- or underperformance on returns in 
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subsequent periods. Finally, through this methodology, I hope to highlight 
profitable trading strategies that investors can employ to capitalize on over- and 
underperformance in box office revenue and/or home entertainment revenue.  
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RESEARCH 
Introduction  
The following sections detail the research that I performed in order to understand 
how changes in film industry revenue and news updates affect investor expectations for 
profitability of the underlying companies. Section 1 explores the roles that opening 
weekend box office “hits” and box office “flops” have on the stock prices of the film 
companies that released them. This section will demonstrate that positive and negative 
news shocks pertaining to the core film business affect investor sentiment. In Section 2, I 
similarly examine box office revenues, but I construct factor portfolios that sort film 
companies based on box office performance over longer periods of time. This second 
section showcases the ways in which box office performance affects the stock prices of 
film companies, and it also reveals the cyclicality of performance in the industry. In 
Section 3, I construct identical factor portfolios using home entertainment revenue 
instead of box office revenue. This third section demonstrates that home entertainment 
performance does not significantly affect investor sentiment or correlate with box office 
performance, corroborating both the cyclicality of the industry and the notion that 
industry outsiders place disproportionate emphasis on box office revenue as a metric for 
performance. Finally, Section 4 includes alternative investment strategies using factor 
portfolios.  
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Section 1: Stock Price Performance of Opening Weekend “Hits” vs. “Flops” 
Overview 
 In this section, I examine the effects that positive and negative news events have 
on investor expectations for profitability. According to Box Office Mojo, opening 
weekend box office performance is a metric that is reported for wide-release films on 
Sunday mornings between 9:00am and 10:00am PST on the weekend of the film’s 
release. The studios provide estimated Friday and Saturday box office revenues with a 
projection for Sunday’s revenues. On the Monday following opening weekend, the 
studios report actual weekend box office revenues at 1:00pm PST. Studios also report 
box office revenue in the first week on the second Friday of release. This information is 
publicly available and easily accessible, leading to changes in stock prices for companies 
whose films overperform or underperform at the box office.  
 I aggregated the daily stock price returns following the release of a new film for 
two distinct sets of films from 2012 through 2018: 
1. Wide-release films in the highest 235 opening weekend box office revenue 
performances of all time 
2. Wide-release films in the lowest 200 opening weekend box office revenue 
performances of all time 
In this section, I examine stock price performance in the days following release for the 
best- and worst-performing films of all time, and I propose trading strategies that could 
be used to profit from opening weekend performance. 
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Figure 1  “Hit”-Minus-“Flop” Portfolio Performance 
 
 
Figure 2  “Hit” Portfolio Performance 
 
 
Figure 3  “Flop” Portfolio Performance 
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Stock price performance of opening weekend “hits” 
 In first thirteen days following the release of a film with an opening weekend box 
office performance in the top 235 of all time by total gross revenue, the companies 
releasing the film experience positive stock price returns at two different points in time. 
Figure 2 tracks the average annualized stock price performance of these box office “hits” 
in the first thirteen days of release (“average daily return” in Figure 2). The companies 
releasing these films first experience an average annual stock return of 4.09% from the 
Friday Close to the Monday Open on the first weekend of release. During this time 
period, on Sunday morning, movie studios release projected total weekend box office 
revenue. The market has already incorporated this information by the time the weekend 
ends, and the aggregate Monday return is indistinguishable from zero. Equivalently, 
investors waiting for the official weekend totals on Monday afternoon are likely too late 
to capitalize on the positive news effect for that weekend. The second instance of positive 
returns occurs on the Friday after opening weekend, which coincides with the release of 
the first week’s total box office revenue. The stock prices of these companies rise by an 
average of 2.41% annually on this Friday. Returns in the second week after a film’s 
release are not significant.  
 The market is sensitive to the positive performance of high-grossing films during 
the early stages of release. However, the stock price in the first two weeks of release only 
reflects the positive performance of the films at specific times when new information 
regarding its performance becomes available rather than evenly throughout the theatrical 
run. This effect demonstrates the speed with which the market incorporates new 
 
 
32 
information as the positive news of the good performance of these films becomes widely 
available.  
 
Stock price performance of opening weekend “flops” 
In first thirteen days following the release of a film with an opening weekend box 
office performance in the bottom 200 of all time by total gross revenue, the companies 
releasing the film experience a negative stock return at two points in time and a positive 
stock return at one point in time. Figure 3 tracks the aggregate stock price performance of 
these box office “flops” in the first thirteen days of release. The stock price returns 
through the first week of release for the companies that produce these films remain 
unchanged as a result of their poor performance during the first week. These companies 
then experience an average annual return of -1.88% on the second weekend of release 
(Friday Close to Monday Open) and an average annual return of -1.73% on the second 
Monday of release. These companies likely experience a delay in the negative returns 
from their underperformance because negative box office underperformance news is 
disseminated much less widely than positive box office overperformance news. Market 
participants, and people in general, are likely to be more immediately aware of the 
movies that are succeeding at the box office than they are of the movies that are failing. 
Because the research of Engle & Ng (1993) would predict that negative news of box 
office “flops” would affect the returns with greater magnitude than the positive news of 
the box office “hits,” it is fair to assume that the films performing poorly at the box office 
had a limited marketing campaign, did not generate social media engagement, and, as a 
result, negative news coverage was more limited. An additional explanation for this delay 
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in negative returns is that box office “flops” earn a higher percentage of their total 
revenue in opening weekend (34%) than box office “hits” (31%). As such, 
underperformance in the first weekend suggests even more dramatic underperformance in 
subsequent weekends. Investors hoping for a second-weekend rebound in revenue 
performance will likely find the opposite effect.  
Interestingly, companies that released movies performing in the bottom 200 of all 
time by total gross revenue in the opening weekend experience an average annual return 
in their stock price of 3.53% on the Thursday in the second week of release. A potential 
explanation for this resurgence in stock price is that the production companies could be 
“cutting their losses” and removing the movies from the theaters in order to reduce their 
costs. The minimum contractually-agreed theatrical run for most movies is two weeks, 
and movies that do not make it to the third weekend are typically losing money for the 
studios and the theaters by the time they are pulled. A strong positive correlation exists 
between box office revenue and theatrical run length (Fahey, 2015), and a movie being 
removed from theaters after only two weeks could be seen by investors as a prudent 
financial decision on the part of the film companies to minimize their losses. 
Additionally, due to the cyclicality of revenues in the film industry, it could be the case 
that film companies releasing weaker films will have a natural propensity to release a 
stronger film in the following two weeks, which could in part explain the positive returns. 
In summary, the market appears to be less immediately and consistently sensitive 
to the underperformance of box office “flops” than it is to the overperformance of box 
office “hits.” A plausible explanation is that the companies producing these 
underperforming films do not attract the same level of investor attention in the first week 
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due to the lesser news volume emerging from underperforming films. It appears that 
these films in the first weekend of release get ignored by both investors and theatergoers 
alike, but investors seem to take note in the second week of release, leading to an initial 
decline in stock prices followed by a late-week resurgence potentially due to stop-loss 
decision making on the part of the film company and/or due to the release of higher-
caliber films.  
 
Stock price performance of “Hit”-Minus-“Flop” Portfolio 
Figure 1 shows the returns of a hypothetical “Hit”-Minus-“Flop” (HMF) portfolio 
that holds the stocks of the companies that had releases in the top 235 opening weekend 
box office performances of all time while shorting the companies that had releases in the 
bottom 200 of all time, subtracting the returns of the poor performers from the high 
performers. In the first thirteen days of release for each given film, this portfolio features 
positive returns on one day and negative returns on one day with the rest of the days 
having returns statistically indistinguishable from zero. From Friday Close to Monday 
Open on opening weekend, this portfolio returns an average of 6.29% annually. As 
previously mentioned, film studios release opening weekend projections on Sunday 
morning, which is during this period of high return. The market incorporates this news 
into the prices of these stocks by the open on Monday, meaning that a portfolio waiting 
for the release of the official box office numbers on Monday to employ such a strategy 
would be too late and miss the spike in returns. 
The HMF portfolio features negative returns on the Thursday in the second week 
of release as the stock prices of companies that released “flops” appreciate. On that day, 
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the HMF portfolio features an average annual return of -2.81%, which could indicate that 
investors assume the strong performance from the “hits” is already “priced in” to the 
company’s valuation while the market could have had an overreaction to the “flop” films, 
creating an attractive buying opportunity, especially if the companies minimize their 
losses by pulling the films from theaters. The key takeaway from the HMF portfolio is 
that the market pays close attention to the opening weekend performances of wide-release 
films and swiftly incorporates that information into the valuations of the respective 
production companies. This example also illustrates the quickness with which news that 
is not explicitly associated with a quarterly update or formal financial report can affect 
equity valuations in this industry. 
 
  
3
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Table 1  Opening Weekend Box Office Returns 
 
 
  
Opening Weekend Box Office Returns
(Average Annual Returns from January 2012 through December 2018)
Portfolios [1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
1.11% 4.09%*** -1.55% -0.15% -0.41% 2.00% 2.41%* -0.45% 0.61%
(0.0243) (0.0148) (0.0266) (0.0087) (0.0193) (0.0231) (0.0134) (0.0230) (0.0153)
1.96% -2.20% 0.79% 0.28% 0.11% 1.15% 1.39% -1.88%* -1.73%**
(0.0271) (0.0172) (0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0248) (0.0111) (0.0092) (0.0104) (0.0074)
-0.85% 6.29%** -2.34% -0.43% -0.53% 0.84% 1.02% 1.43% 2.34%
(0.0288) (0.0249) (0.0375) (0.0139) (0.0366) (0.0225) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0206)
[1] = This column features average annual returns from Friday Open to Friday Close on the first day of release with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[2] = This column features average annual returns from Friday Close to Monday Open on the first weekend of release with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[3] = This column features average annual returns from Monday Open to Monday Close on the first day after opening weekend with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[4] = This column features average annual returns from Tuesday Open to Tuesday Close on the second day after opening weekend with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[5] = This column features average annual returns from Wednesday Open to Wednesday Close on the third day after opening weekend with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[6] = This column features average annual returns from Thursday Open to Thursday Close on the fourth day after opening weekend with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[7] = This column features average annual returns from Friday Open to Friday Close on the fifth day after opening weekend with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[8] = This column features average annual returns from Friday Close to Monday Open on the second weekend of release with the standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
[9] = This column features average annual returns from Monday Open to Monday Close on the first day after the second weekend of release with standard errors of the returns in parenthesis below.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
"Hits" Portfolio (H)
Companies with Movies Grossing 
in Top 235 of All Time
"Flops" Portfolio (F) 
Companies with Wide-Release 
Movies Grossing in Bottom 200 of 
All Time
"Hits"-Minus-"Flops" (HMF)
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom 
Portfolio Return
(Average a nual returns fr   2 through December 2018) 
 37 
Potential trading strategies from opening weekend box office performance 
 Multiple profitable trading strategies emerge from this analysis of opening 
weekend box office returns featured in Table 1, including potential for long-only 
strategies, short-only strategies, and long-short strategies. Three examples of strategies 
that provide high risk-adjusted returns are (1) holding stocks of companies that release 
movies in the top 235 from Friday Close to Monday Open on opening weekend, (2) 
holding stocks of companies that release movies in the top 235 while shorting stocks of 
companies that release movies in the bottom 200 from Friday Close to Monday Open on 
opening weekend, and (3) holding stocks of companies that release movies in the top 235 
from Friday Close to Monday Open on opening weekend while shorting stocks of 
companies that release movies in the bottom 200 from Friday Close to Monday Close one 
week after opening weekend.  
 The first strategy, which is displayed in Table 1, will receive an average annual 
return of 4.09% from holding the “hit” stocks from Friday Close to Monday Open. The 
annual standard deviation of this long-only strategy is 3.93%, which implies a Sharpe 
Ratio of 0.91 assuming a risk-free rate of return of 0.53%. 
 The second strategy, which is a function of the HMF strategy outlined in the 
previous subsection and in Table 1, will receive an average annual return of 6.29%. The 
annual standard deviation of this long-short strategy is 6.60%, which implies a Sharpe 
Ratio of 0.87 assuming a risk-free rate of return of 0.53%. 
 Finally, the third strategy, which holds the “hit” stocks from Friday Close to 
Monday Open on opening weekend and shorts the “flop” stocks from Friday Close to 
Monday Close the following weekend, will receive an average annual return of 7.71%. 
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The annual standard deviation of this long-short strategy is 5.56%, which implies a 
Sharpe Ratio of 1.29 assuming a risk-free rate of return of 0.53%.  
 
Conclusion 
The main result of this analysis using opening weekend box office performance is 
that the market swiftly incorporates positive news regarding opening weekend 
overperformance into the equity valuations of the companies releasing the films. These 
films see significant appreciation in their stock prices even before the official weekend 
revenue performance numbers are released. The market takes approximately one week to 
incorporate the negative news of opening weekend box office underperformance, and the 
companies releasing these films see depreciation in their equity valuations during the 
second weekend of release and the Monday thereafter. This delayed effect could emerge 
from smaller volume of negative news as well as the likelihood of continued box office 
revenue underperformance in the second weekend of release. These findings regarding 
market reactions to opening weekend box office performance can be used to develop 
trading strategies that generate significant annual returns.  
 
Section 2: Factor Portfolio Analysis of Monthly Box Office Revenue   
Overview    
In the previous section, I examined the effects of box office over- and 
underperformance on a short time scale to isolate and highlight the specific points in the 
cycle of a film’s initial release at which investors adjust their assumptions regarding the 
expected revenue of film companies. In this section, I alter the approach by extending the 
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time frame and looking at overall studio performance rather than performance specific to 
one film at a brief point in time. Constructing factor portfolios that are sorted according 
to YoY percentage box office revenue change and holding the top portfolio while 
shorting the bottom portfolio will reveal the degree to which the market awards excess 
returns to companies that generate high box office revenue over their lower-performing 
counterparts over varying durations. Extending the duration of the sample of performance 
and returns also reveals the cyclicality of performance in this industry due to the limited 
nature of premium content and inability for firms to smooth their revenue receipts over 
long periods of time. In this section, I demonstrate the effect that box office performance 
has on the stock prices of film companies both (a) contemporaneously and (b) 
conditionally, and I (c) propose additional trading strategies that could be employed to 
capitalize on the effect that box office performance has on stock prices over longer 
periods of time.    
 
Contemporaneous factor portfolio returns 
 Table 2 and Table 3 demonstrate the contemporaneous returns of factor portfolios 
sorted by YoY percentage change in box office revenues for periods of one month, three 
months, six months, and 12 months. These tables illustrate that better performance at the 
box office translates to higher returns in stock price over the same period for certain 
durations of time. This finding is consistent with both the research of Powers (2015), 
which notes that film industry financial reporting is often opaque and judged solely 
according to box office performance, and with the finding from the previous section that 
strong box office performance leads to higher returns. 
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 Table 2 groups the companies based on box office performance into three 
portfolios: “top,” “mid,” and “bottom.” The “top” portfolio contains the top two 
companies for each given period, the “mid” portfolio contains the three-to-five middle 
companies, and the “bottom” portfolio contains the bottom two companies. Holding the 
“top” portfolio and shorting the “bottom” portfolio yields significant positive 
contemporaneous returns with portfolio sorting periods of three, six, and 12 months. The 
strongest contemporaneous returns occur with a sorting period of three months. This 
sorting period features an annualized return of 14.04%, and the portfolios exhibit 
monotonically increasing returns ascending from the worst-performing to the best-
performing portfolio. Though the portfolios with sorting periods of six and twelve 
months also feature significant positive returns, these annualized returns are not as high, 
and the returns do not increase with monotonicity from the worst performers to the best 
performers. A plausible explanation for the superiority of the three-month sorting period 
is that the cyclicality of the industry results in periods of high box office revenue being 
followed by periods of low box office revenue. Sorting across periods of time longer than 
three months will be less indicative of the true high-performing studios because the box 
office revenue of those studios will drop once their high-performing movies complete the 
theatrical run and the studios do not release similarly high-performing content during the 
following several months. 
 Table 3 details an identical exercise with the exception that the portfolio 
groupings were adjusted to include three constituents in the “top” portfolio and three 
constituents in the “bottom” portfolio, eliminating the “mid” portfolio. With these 
portfolio constructions, only the three-month and six-month sorting periods exhibit 
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significant positive returns when holding the “top” portfolio and shorting the “bottom” 
portfolio. As with the previous exercise, the three-month sorting period produces the 
highest returns.  
 The contemporaneous factor portfolios further illustrate that investors pay 
attention to box office revenues, and a high YoY percentage change in box office revenue 
will produce higher returns, especially with a sorting period of three months.   
  
4
2
 
Table 2  Box Office Annualized Contemporaneous Returns – 3 Portfolios 
 
 
 
 
 
Annualized Contemporaneous Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office h
(Annualized Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
h
Portfolios [1] [2] [3] [4]
8.67% 15.40%** 17.08%*** 20.61%***
(0.0573) (0.0617) (0.0553) (0.0577)
11.49%* 8.04% 7.52% 8.19%**
(0.0623) (0.0529) (0.0530) (0.0416)
4.86% 1.36% 9.17% 10.94%**
(0.0654) (0.0240) (0.0635) (0.0480)
3.81% 14.04%*** 7.91%* 9.67%**
(0.0595) (0.0518) (0.0473) (0.0482)
[1] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the one-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[2] = This column shows annualized three-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the three-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[3] = This column shows annualized six-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the six-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[4] = This column shows annualized 12-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the 12-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Two Companies with Highest YoY Box 
Office % Change
Mid Portfolio
3-5 Companies Between Top and 
Bottom Portfolios based on YoY Box 
Office % Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Two Companies with Lowest YoY Box 
Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom 
Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199) 
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Table 3  Box Office Annualized Contemporaneous Returns – 2 Portfolios 
 
 
Annualized Contemporaneous Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office h
(Annualized Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
h
[1] [2] [3] [4]
10.31%* 12.04%** 13.78%*** 16.54%***
(0.0561) (0.0576) (0.0538) (0.0489)
5.29% 1.94% 7.32% 10.80%**
(0.0642) (0.0228) (0.0560) (0.0456)
5.03% 10.10%** 6.46%* 5.74%
(0.0561) (0.0459) (0.0373) (0.0358)
[1] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the one-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[2] = This column shows annualized three-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the three-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[3] = This column shows annualized six-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the six-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[4] = This column shows annualized 12-month returns that occur contemporaneously with the 12-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Three Companies with Highest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Three Companies with Lowest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - 
Bottom Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly returns fro  y  to November 2018 | N=199) 
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Conditional factor portfolio returns 
In the previous section, I demonstrated that superior performance at the box office 
will generally lead to higher returns in stock price over the same period. In the following 
section, I examine how the stock prices of film companies perform in a given period, 
conditional upon being either among the best-performing or the worst-performing 
companies at the box office in the prior period of equal duration. Table 4 and Table 5 
show the annualized conditional returns of factor portfolios sorted by YoY percentage 
change in box office revenues for periods of one month, three months, six months, and 12 
months. These tables illustrate that better performance at the box office translates to 
higher returns in stock price over the following period of equal duration only at certain 
lengths. In some instances, positive box office performance can indicate negative returns 
in the following period. 
As in the previous section, Table 4 groups the companies into three different 
portfolios: “top,” “mid,” and “bottom.” A key finding from this approach is that 
companies that perform best at the box office over a three-month period will outperform 
the companies that performed the worst in that period by 10.51% annually over the 
following three months. The portfolios exhibit monotonically increasing returns 
ascending from the “bottom”  portfolio to the “top” portfolio. Possible explanations for 
this comparatively large return over the following three months include lagging ancillary 
revenue streams (e.g., consumer products, streaming contracts, etc.), positive quarterly 
earnings surprises, and positive momentum. When sorting with a period length of six 
months, companies in the “top” portfolio do not experience significant excess returns 
over companies in the “bottom” portfolio. When using a period length of 12 months, the 
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cyclicality of the film industry becomes evident. The equity returns of companies in the 
“top” portfolio will underperform those of companies in the “bottom” portfolio by 
10.12% annually in the 12 months following the superior box office performance of the 
“top” companies. The portfolios with a sorting period of 12 months also exhibit 
monotonically decreasing returns when ascending from the “bottom” portfolio to the 
“top” portfolio. This finding highlights the cyclicality of revenue receipts in the film 
industry, which is characterized by a scarce amount of premium content. Studios that 
release landmark films in one year often struggle to match this performance in the next 
year after exhausting their premium content. Equivalently, they create a high benchmark 
for themselves that they must try to meet with a weaker slate of content available to be 
released in the following year. Table 4 indicates that the market reacts to the cyclicality 
of the film industry.  
Table 5 consolidates the three portfolios into two portfolios with three 
constituents each. The findings from Table 5 are similar to those from Table 4, but the 
returns are less extreme. With a three-month period, the “top” portfolio outperforms the 
“bottom” portfolio by 8.99% annually. With a twelve-month period, the “top” portfolio 
underperforms the “bottom” portfolio by 6.43% annually. This approach also captures the 
reactions of investors to the inherent cyclicality of revenue in the film industry. 
By showing the inconsistent equity return performance of film companies in the 
varying periods after their respective strong or weak box office performance, I have 
demonstrated the cyclicality of the film industry and the corresponding fluctuations in 
investor sentiment. The underperformance of equity returns in the 12 months following 
strong box office performance are likely attributable to unobserved heterogeneity as 
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opposed to a direct causal relationship. Companies that perform well in a given 12 
months are less likely to duplicate their success in the following 12 months due to the 
single-use nature of their content and the high standard against which they will be judged 
by investors going forward.  
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Table 4  Box Office Annualized Conditional Returns – 3 Portfolios 
 
 
 
Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office
(Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199) (Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
13.43%** 13.14%** 18.23%*** 10.32%**
(0.0599) (0.0579) (0.0589) (0.0499)
6.66% 9.50%* 7.93%* 12.40%***
(0.0629) (0.0532) (0.0475) (0.0402)
5.27% 2.63% 15.24%*** 20.44%**
(0.0639) (0.0243) (0.0588) (0.0610)
8.15% 10.51%** 2.99% -10.12%**
(0.0647) (0.0459) (0.0440) (0.0510)
[1] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the one-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[2] = This column shows annualized three-month returns that occur conditionally after the three-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[3] = This column shows annualized six-month returns that occur conditionally after the six-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[4] = This column shows annualized 12-month returns that occur conditionally after the 12-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Two Companies with Highest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Mid Portfolio
2-5 Companies Between Top 
and Bottom Portfolios based 
on YoY Box Office % Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Two Companies with Lowest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - 
Bottom Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199) 
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Table 5  Box Office Annualized Conditional Returns – 2 Portfolios 
 
 
Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office
(Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199) (Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
10.46%* 11.66%** 15.76%*** 11.45%***
(0.0572) (0.0560) (0.0547) (0.0448)
7.28% 2.67% 13.12%** 17.88%***
(0.0590) (0.0211) (0.0542) (0.0515)
3.18% 8.99%** 2.64% -6.43%**
(0.0484) (0.0433) (0.0362) (0.0371)
[1] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the one-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[2] = This column shows annualized three-month returns that occur conditionally after the three-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[3] = This column shows annualized six-month returns that occur conditionally after the six-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[4] = This column shows annualized 12-month returns that occur conditionally after the 12-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Three Companies with Highest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Three Companies with Lowest 
YoY Box Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom 
Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199) 
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Conditional factor portfolio trading strategies 
 Due to the infeasibility of developing a trading strategy from the 
contemporaneous factor portfolios (i.e., when the return period is the same as the sorting 
period), I exclusively discuss trading strategies pertaining to the conditional factor 
portfolios. One profitable strategy using the portfolios in Table 4 would involve 
constructing a pairs trade that buys the “top” portfolio and shorts the “bottom” portfolio 
using the period length of three months. This strategy would feature an annualized return 
of 10.51% with an annual standard deviation of 25.55%. Assuming a risk-free rate of 
return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio of 0.36. A long-only strategy 
that simply buys the “top” portfolio features an average annual return of 13.14% with an 
annual standard deviation of 29.98%. Assuming a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this 
strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio of 0.40. With a sorting period length of 12 months, 
a pairs trade that buys the “bottom” portfolio and shorts the “top” portfolio will feature an 
average annual return of 10.12% and an annual standard deviation of 36.12%. Assuming 
a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio of 0.24. A 
long-only strategy that simply buys the “bottom” portfolio under the 12-month sorting 
period will feature an average annual return of 20.44% and an annual standard deviation 
of 39.04%. Assuming a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.49. These strategies include only two companies per portfolio and, as a 
result, will feature large amounts of idiosyncratic volatility resulting from inadequate 
diversification.  
 The returns to these same strategies using the portfolios in Table 5 are more 
modest, but they accordingly feature less idiosyncratic volatility. With a sorting period of 
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three months, a pairs trade that buys the “top” portfolio and shorts the “bottom” portfolio 
will have an average annual return of 8.99% and an annual standard deviation of 22.45%. 
Assuming a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio 
of 0.34. A long-only strategy that buys the “top” portfolio will have an average annual 
return of 11.66% and an annual standard deviation of 23.94%. Assuming a risk-free rate 
of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio of 0.43. With a sorting 
period of 12 months, a pairs trade that buys the “bottom” portfolio and shorts the “top” 
portfolio will have an average annual return of 6.43% and an annual standard deviation of 
26.61%. Assuming a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a 
Sharpe Ratio of 0.19. A long-only strategy that buys the “bottom” portfolio will have an 
average annual return of 17.88% and an annual standard deviation of 31.96%. Assuming 
a risk-free rate of return of 1.28%, this strategy would feature a Sharpe Ratio of 0.52. 
 These trading strategies, though significantly positive, feature large annual 
standard deviations that result from the fact that these portfolios feature little 
diversification. A portfolio comprised of only two or three companies will be largely 
impacted by idiosyncratic volatility because each portfolio constituent makes up a sizable 
percentage of the total portfolio. The high degree of consolidation within the film 
industry has reduced the number of publicly traded companies to the extent that 
constructing thoroughly diversified portfolios in this industry would be impossible. 
Additionally, each of these companies by design resides within the same industry, and 
market conditions that disproportionately affect the industry will disproportionately affect 
these portfolios. However, the long-short strategies provide some hedge against industry 
risk. In short, it is possible to construct factor portfolios sorted by box office revenues 
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and implement profitable trading strategies, but these strategies will be susceptible to 
large amounts of idiosyncratic and industry-related volatility.  
 
Section 3: Factor Portfolio Analysis of Home Entertainment Revenue 
Overview 
 In the previous section, I examined returns to factor portfolios sorted by box 
office performance for given periods of time. In the following section, I use the exact 
same methodology except that I sort the companies by monthly home entertainment 
revenue instead of box office revenue. As I explained in the Literature Review section, 
home entertainment revenues make up a large percentage of total film industry revenue. 
However, equity valuations appear to be less sensitive to fluctuations in home 
entertainment revenues. In the following section, I (a) show the results from creating 
factor portfolios sorted by home entertainment revenue performance over specified 
intervals of time and (b) provide some potential explanations of my empirical findings.  
 
Factor portfolio results 
Though I duplicated my box office factor portfolio efforts exactly with the home 
entertainment revenue data (i.e., both contemporaneously and conditionally, with both 
two and three constituents per portfolio), I will exhibit only one set of sorting 
methodologies due to the consistent lack of significant results across all four 
methodologies. Table 6 shows the results from conditional factor portfolios with three 
constituents per portfolio.  
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 Aside from the use of home entertainment revenue, the only difference in Table 6 
from the previous factor portfolio tables is that I report annualized “industry-adjusted” 
returns by subtracting the return of the industry for each respective period from the 
returns of the “top” and “bottom” portfolios. When I do this, it becomes apparent that the 
returns from sorting companies by home entertainment revenue do not significantly differ 
from zero in any case. This claim holds true across all iterations of the factor portfolio 
criteria I examined in Section 2.  
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Table 6  Home Entertainment Annualized Conditional Returns 
 
 
  
Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Home Entertainment h
(Monthly industry-adjusted returns from January 2011 to November 2018 | N=95)
h
Portfolios [1] [2] [3] [4]
-4.91% -1.37% 3.31% 0.32%
(0.0797) (0.0427) (0.0565) (0.0509)
4.23% 0.58% -2.93% -1.10%
(0.0704) (0.0443) (0.0435) (0.0471)
-9.14% -1.95% 6.24% 1.43%
(0.0696) (0.0386) (0.0400) (0.0225)
[1] = This column shows annualized one-month industry-adjusted returns that occur conditionally after the one-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[2] = This column shows annualized three-month industry-adjusted returns that occur conditionally after the three-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[3] = This column shows annualized six-month returns industry-adjusted that occur conditionally after the six-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[4] = This column shows annualized 12-month industry-adjusted returns that occur conditionally after the 12-month sorting period. Heteroskedasticity-adjusted standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Three Companies with Highest YoY Home Ent. % 
Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Three Companies with Lowest YoY Home Ent. % 
Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly industry-adjusted returns from January 2011 to November 2018 | N=95) 
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Explanations for lack of significance in home entertainment factor portfolios 
 The home entertainment factor portfolios do not produce significant returns 
because of several potential factors. The first factor is that, though home entertainment 
revenue makes up a large percentage of total film industry revenue, these revenue 
numbers broken out by company and by time period are inaccessible to the general public 
without paying to obtain this proprietary information from a data analysis group. 
Whereas box office revenue is reported online for investors, news agencies, and the 
general public to examine free of charge, people must pay for home entertainment 
revenue data provided by the various point-of-sale merchants (e.g., Walmart, Best Buy, 
etc.) that has been aggregated by a data provider. This data is less likely to be 
incorporated into the market than data that is disseminated freely.  
A second factor is that home entertainment releases occur 88 days after the 
opening weekend theatrical release. The news impact of these delayed releases will likely 
have negligible, if any, impact on the equity prices of these companies. People become 
less interested in these films after the films have already been consumed by the general 
public and have completed their theatrical run. Three months after a film has been 
released, consistent with the “efficient market hypothesis,” asset prices are likely to 
incorporate immediately investors’ assessments as to whether the movie is a “hit” or a 
“flop,” thus reducing the potential for a long-delayed effect due to home entertainment 
sales. Additionally, another issue that reduces the impact of home entertainment news on 
investor expectations for profitability is that, because home entertainment revenue starts 
to occur three months after a film is released theatrically, the home entertainment revenue 
will be recognized in the following quarter’s earnings report, which will be associated 
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with different box office performance. The box office revenue of the industry for a given 
month has a -0.50 correlation with box office revenue of the industry three months later. 
A third factor that could also explain the lack of an effect of home entertainment 
revenues on investor expectations for profitability is the lack of a large correlation 
between home entertainment revenues and box office revenues. Table 7 demonstrates this 
lack of correlation between the various factor portfolios. This lack of correlation makes it 
difficult for investors (or even industry insiders) to predict home entertainment revenues 
based on box office revenues. Intuitively, one would expect home entertainment sales to 
increase proportionally with box office revenues. One could argue that, when a film 
receives large amounts of attention and gets media exposure, people will be more likely 
to purchase that film on DVD or Blu-Ray. However, there exists a confounding effect 
that results in extreme diminishing marginal returns to the effect of box office revenue on 
home entertainment revenue. When people see a movie in the theaters, they are often less 
inclined to purchase or rent a copy of the movie because they have already seen the 
movie. Equivalently, overwhelming success of a film at the box office has potential to 
reduce the market for people renting or owning the title after the film completes its 
theatrical release. On the other hand, films that underperform at the box office will have a 
larger market of people who have not yet seen the movie and could be more willing to 
rent it or purchase it. This confounding effect makes it difficult to predict how a film will 
perform on home entertainment after its theatrical release even when one has the 
available historical data to examine.  
In summary, home entertainment revenues alone do not appear to significantly 
alter investor assessments of a company’s profitability despite home entertainment’s high 
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degree of importance in affecting the bottom lines of these film companies. This lack of 
an effect likely emerges from the nature of the information, which is less readily 
available to the public, the lagged nature of the revenue streams, and confounding factors 
emerging from the unpredictability of home entertainment revenues based on box office 
performance. This finding is consistent with the discussion in the Literature Review that 
investors place disproportionate emphasis on box office performance. 
 
Table 7  Box Office / Home Entertainment Correlations 
 
 
 
  
Panel A: Top Portfolios (Correlations)
BO Top Real Time BO Top (Lag 3 Months) BO Top (Lag 6 Months) BO Top (Lag 12 Months)
HE Top Real Time -0.06 0.08 0.14 0.13
HE Top (Lag 3 Months) 0.10 -0.03 0.02 0.07
HE Top (Lag 6 Months) 0.05 0.10 0.00 0.15
HE Top (Lag 12 Months) -0.01 0.16 0.06 -0.01
Panel B: Bottom Portfolios (Correlations)
BO Bottom Real Time BO Bottom (Lag 3 Months) BO Bottom (Lag 6 Months) BO Bottom (Lag 12 Months)
HE Bottom Real Time -0.09 -0.11 0.12 0.14
HE Bottom (Lag 3 Months) -0.08 -0.09 -0.10 -0.10
HE Bottom (Lag 6 Months) 0.13 -0.07 -0.10 0.12
HE Bottom (Lag 12 Months) 0.08 0.15 0.27 -0.02
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Section 4: Alternate Investment Strategies Using Box Office Factor Portfolios 
Overview 
 In addition to the factor portfolio strategies that I have previously outlined for box 
office revenues, I have also experimented with constructing conditional factor portfolios 
based on returns that are consistently one month in duration regardless of the sorting 
period length. These portfolios do not feature similarly significant returns in a long-short 
strategy relative to the portfolios in which the length of the return period matched the 
length of the sorting period. In this section, I briefly outline (a) the results from these 
factor portfolios and (b) potential explanations for the lack of significant findings in a 
long-short strategy.  
 
Results from one-month return factor portfolios 
 Table 8 and Table 9 demonstrate the returns of the conditional factor portfolios in 
which the “returns” are the annualized stock returns in the one month following the 
sorting period. These portfolios frequently exhibit significantly positive returns, but these 
returns are due in large part to the return of the overall industry as opposed to the 
observable characteristic by which these portfolios are being sorted. In the two-
constituent portfolios, the returns do not monotonically increase or decrease when 
ascending from the “bottom” portfolio to the “top” portfolio for any sorting period length. 
Additionally, though certain individual portfolios do feature significantly positive returns, 
the “overall return” portfolio does not feature returns significantly different from zero 
with any sorting period length using either the two-constituent or three-constituent 
portfolios. Thus, I cannot say definitively that using a fixed one-month return in 
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constructing factor portfolios would provide a return for the “top” portfolio that is 
significantly different from the “bottom” portfolio. 
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Table 8  One-Month Box Office Annualized Conditional Returns – 3 Portfolios 
 
 
Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office h
(Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
h
[5] [6] [7]
12.16%** 13.73%** 13.44%**
(0.0604) (0.0626) (0.0591)
6.21% 2.82% 1.75%
(0.0580) (0.0596) (0.0586)
7.18% 10.66%* 11.92%*
(0.0675) (0.0639) (0.0696)
4.99% 3.07% 1.51%
(0.0600) (0.0618) (0.0615)
[5] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the three-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[6] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the six-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[7] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the 12-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Two Companies with Highest YoY Box 
Office % Change
Mid Portfolio
2-5 Companies Between Top and Bottom 
Portfolios based on YoY Box Office % 
Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Two Companies with Lowest YoY Box 
Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom Portfolio 
Return
(Annualized monthly eturns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=1 9) 
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Table 9  One-Month Box Office Annualized Conditional Returns – 2 Portfolios 
 
 
Annualized Conditional Factor Portfolio Returns - Box Office
(Monthly returns from May 2002 to November 2018 | N=199)
Portfolios [5] [6] [7]
10.58%* 11.62%** 5.95%
(0.0560) (0.0565) (0.0545)
7.34% 8.65% 12.00%**
(0.0594) (0.0625) (0.0612)
3.23% 2.98% -6.06%
(0.0484) (0.0505) (0.0519)
[5] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the three-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[6] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the six-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
[7] = This column shows annualized one-month returns that occur conditionally after the 12-month sorting period. Standard errors are below in parenthesis.
*, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 90%, 95%, and 99% levels, respectively.
Top Portfolio 
Three Companies with Highest YoY 
Box Office % Change
Bottom Portfolio 
Three Companies with Lowest YoY Box 
Office % Change
Overall Return
= Top Portfolio Return - Bottom 
Portfolio Return
(Annualized monthly returns from May 2002 to Nov mber 2018 | N=199) 
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Potential explanations for findings 
 In this section, I have shown that, in order to capitalize on box office returns in a 
factor portfolio strategy, one needs to use an equity holding period equivalent in length to 
the sorting period. A holding period of one month after the sorting period does not allow 
for a statistically significant difference in returns between the “top” portfolio and the 
“bottom” portfolio. One explanation for this could be that the next month following a 
three-month sorting period will not always include a quarterly earnings update and the 
associated positive or negative news bump from the overperformance or 
underperformance in box office revenue, which is likely a strong contributor to the 
statistically significant differences in return associated with a three-month holding period. 
A holding period of one month after a sorting period of 12 months does not capture the 
full effect that the cyclicality of revenues in the film industry will have on stock price 
returns in the following year. This cyclicality is more fully captured with a holding period 
of 12 months, which leads to a stark difference in returns between the “top” portfolio and 
the “bottom” portfolio. For the purpose of developing trading strategies based on box 
office performance, a conditional holding period of one month following the sorting 
period would be inadvisable due to the lack of a statistically significant difference 
between the “top” and “bottom” portfolios and the lack of any semblance of 
monotonicity or predictable pattern in these returns. 
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CONCLUSION 
 Through the analysis that I have performed in this research paper, I have 
established that the market incorporates certain elements of film performance to greater 
degrees than others when determining appropriate equity valuations. The market places a 
high degree of emphasis on box office revenue, and it is possible to construct profitable 
trading strategies using publicly available box office information both on a short-term 
scale (looking at daily box office performance) and a long-term scale (looking at monthly 
box office performance). Through similar analysis exercises, I have shown that the 
market behaves differently with respect to home entertainment revenue. Under the same 
methodology by which I constructed the box office factor portfolios, the home 
entertainment factor portfolios do not in any case reveal a statistically significant 
difference in returns between high-performing companies and low-performing companies 
as a function of home entertainment revenue. Though this finding should seem surprising 
considering that home entertainment revenue makes up a sizable segment of the industry, 
the inaccessibility of home entertainment data, the inherent lag of the home entertainment 
revenue stream, and other confounding factors make it difficult for investors to value film 
companies as a function of home entertainment revenue. As such, the empirical home 
entertainment revenue data bears no relationship with investor expectations for 
profitability despite its relative importance to the industry. 
 Additionally, the research that I have performed shows how stock prices react at 
certain periods in time to relatively strong or weak box office performance. For instance, 
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high-performing films at the box office can lead to a spike in stock price during the first 
weekend of release. This finding demonstrates that the market immediately incorporates 
new information into equity valuations regarding the performance of high-grossing films. 
Films that perform extraordinarily poorly at the box office typically see a delay of about a 
week before experiencing significantly negative returns. Profitable trading strategies can 
be constructed to capitalize on these box office performance phenomena. The factor 
portfolio analysis exposes the inherent cyclicity of the film industry in which content that 
drives people to theaters is scarce, and film companies cannot smooth this revenue stream 
over longer periods of time. In the three months following a three-month period of strong 
performance at the box office, companies will experience significant excess returns over 
companies that performed poorly at the box office. This effect likely emerges from the 
incorporation of the box office performance into the earnings reports, the strong 
performance of contemporaneous ancillary revenue streams, and general momentum in 
the stock. On the other hand, the stock prices of film companies that overperform at the 
box office for a given 12-month period will significantly underperform competitors 
during the following year. This underperformance can be attributed to the lack of 
comparable content these film studios are likely to produce in the following year and a 
reversion to the mean in their box office performance, which, when examined YoY by 
analysts will look like secular decline in performance. 
 In short, the objective of this paper was to examine how and when the market 
incorporates key elements of film industry performance into the equity valuations of the 
underlying companies. After examining the data, I can say conclusively that the market 
pays attention to how companies perform at the box office, and it reacts in predictable 
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ways and at predictable times to relative over- and underperformance at the box office. 
Based on the data I have examined and the techniques that I have used, the same cannot 
be said for the ancillary home entertainment revenue stream. The market appears to place 
disproportionate emphasis on box office performance in determining equity valuations 
due to its public accessibility and its status as the conventional metric by which film 
performance should be evaluated. 
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FUTURE RESEARCH OPPORTUNITIES 
 The research that I have performed in constructing factor portfolios to determine 
the effects of box office performance and home entertainment performance on equity 
valuations appears to be the first of its kind. However, I believe that significant progress 
could be made by expanding this research question and examining it from other angles. 
In this section, I outline two specific strategies that could be implemented in future 
research to evaluate further the effects that film industry revenue has on investor 
sentiments for profitability.  
 
The Effect of Budget-Adjusted Box Office Performance on Equity Valuations 
 In Section 1, I examined how the stock prices of box office “hits” performed 
relative to those of box office “flops” in the days and weeks following the initial release. 
Due to data constraints, I simply defined “hits” as films that grossed in the top 235 
opening weekend releases of all time and “flops” as wide-release films that performed in 
the bottom 200 opening weekend releases of all time. However, it is possible that films 
with staggeringly large budgets could land in the “hits” category while being completely 
unprofitable, and it is possible that films on “shoe-string” budgets could land in the 
“flops” category while being entirely profitable. These categories do not consider budgets 
or expectations. 
 Future research could adjust relative box office performance by incorporating 
budgets of films to describe performance more accurately. In addition to being more 
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precise, this research could be applied to every film that is ever released as opposed to 
exclusively the films on the two extreme ends of the revenue spectrum. This research 
could potentially add significant value to the research that I have performed in this study. 
 
The Effect of Consumer Product Revenue on Equity Valuations 
 In this paper, I examined the effect of home entertainment revenue on equity 
valuations, and I could not conclude that home entertainment revenue over- or 
underperformance significantly affects the stock prices of film companies. However, I 
believe that consumer product revenue could potentially affect or serve as a leading 
indicator for film company equity valuations even though companies derive less revenue 
from consumer products than from home entertainment. Despite the relatively smaller 
size of the market, I would hypothesize that consumer product sales have a higher 
correlation than home entertainment sales with box office revenue. As mentioned 
previously, people who see a movie in theaters are often less likely to rent or buy it on 
DVD, and people who do not see it in theaters are often more likely to rent or buy it when 
it comes out on home entertainment. Consumer goods, on the other hand, are 
complementary to seeing a movie in theaters rather than substitutionary. 
 Additionally, this research could be particularly interesting because consumer 
goods for big movies are often released before the movie’s theatrical release. Consumer 
goods revenue might be able to predict how a movie will do in theaters, which, in turn, 
could predict how the stock price of that film company will react in the future based on 
the analysis that I have performed in this paper. I believe that this research could be 
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incredibly valuable in continuing the work that I have started and could significantly 
enhance some of the trading strategies that I have proposed in this paper.  
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